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1. INTRODUCTION 
On December 17 2010, the Tunisian fruit seller Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on 
fire. His self-immolation was a desperate reaction to the structural harassment of the Tunisian 
officials. His action caused a chain of events in the Arab world first known as the Arab Spring 
and later as the Arab Uprising. There were mass demonstrations all over the region. People 
demanded bread, jobs, dignity, and even more important “it was cry for accountability, for 
political freedom, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly” (Butenschøn, 2015, p. 
125). In both countries they demanded the resignation of the oppressors to become more 
prosperous and inclusive. Only Tunisia succeeded in becoming so, which is seen as one of the 
rare successes of the Arab Spring. Egypt on the other hand, after a brief period of democratic 
rule, returned to a more oppressive authoritarian rule than the period before (Hamzawy, 
2017).  In this bachelor dissertation an attempt will be made to answer the question: what 
explains the relative success of democratization in Tunisia compared to the resilience of the 
autocratic state in Egypt after the Arab Uprisings? 
A comparison will be made between the countries Egypt and Tunisia. This article will 
focus on the institutions in both countries to explain the different outcomes. Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s book Why Nations Fail gives an interesting theory that can explain the 
institutional change after the Arab uprisings. There are two reasons for explaining the 
divergent outcomes via the theory of Acemoglu and Robinson. The first reason is that Middle 
Eastern authoritarian regimes have proven to be exceptional ‘robust’ (Hess, 2013, p. 261). 
Still, radical institutional change happened in both Egypt and Tunisia. Many scholars held this 
impossible (Bellin, 2012). On the other hand, Acemoglu and Robinson give a convincing 
theory why this was possible. The second reason for applying the theory of Acemoglu and 
Robinson is that it also explains the making of more inclusive institutions or why it fails to do 
so after a critical juncture. 
Critical junctures in conjunction with institutional drift 
Major institutional changes can occur as a result of the interaction between existing 
institutions1 and critical junctures. Institutions can be described as ‘rules of the game’. Once 
in place they tend to persist (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). Even though institutions main 
                                                            
1 . Institutions are a set of formal rules (including constitutions), informal norms, or shared 
understandings that constrain and prescribe political actors’ interactions with one another (Gilad, 
2018). 
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characteristic is continuity, they can change. Change often occurs after a critical juncture. 
Critical junctures are major events that disrupt the existing political status quo. How 
institutions handle critical junctures is vital in the process of change. This is influenced by 
institutional drift. Institutional drift means that institutions undergo small random changes that 
result in the institutions drifting apart (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013, p. 431).  Institutional 
drift leads to small differences. It is the interaction with critical junctures that can cause 
radical divergences in otherwise quite similar societies (ibid, p. 432). In sum, the institutions 
present at the time of a critical juncture were influenced by institutional drift. This 
institutional drift therefore determines how institutions react during a critical juncture. Which 
eventually determines the outcome. This doesn’t mean that a critical juncture will always 
result in a successful political revolution or change for the better (ibid, p. 111).  
To apply the theory of Acemoglu and Robinson there needs to be a critical juncture. 
For a juncture to be rated a critical juncture it has to fulfil three stages: a crisis, radical 
ideational change and radical policy change (Hogan & Doyle, 2007, p. 884). The Arab 
uprising clearly qualifies. Firstly, there was a major crisis. This showed through the Tunisian 
and Egyptian people going on the streets in mass demonstrations for political freedom and 
economic prosperity. This massive mobilization of people in both Egypt and Tunisia was a 
bottom-up process (Butenschøn, 2015, p. 121). The radical ideational change was the breach 
with the authoritarian bargain. The authoritarian bargain refers to the relation between the 
authoritarian ruler and its population. The bargain gave the ruler all the power. In return for 
the democratic deficit, the people received public services provided by the state, such as 
security or economic prosperity. The rulers already failed to comply to the authoritarian 
bargain a long time ago. With the Arab uprising the people finally stood up for their rights 
(ibid). Some even described the ideational change as ‘death of fear’ (Aljazeera, 2015, 
December 16). This ideational change is of importance, because without it the ‘rules of the 
game’ won’t change. Resulting in no change in the institutions (Gabsi, 2017, p. 14). Lastly, 
the radical policy change was fulfilled with overthrowing the authoritarian rulers. Marking a 
clear end of the Arab uprising as critical juncture (Butenschøn, 2015, p. 112). A critical 
juncture is important according to Acemoglu & Robinson. Nevertheless, there is more needed 
than a critical juncture for positive change. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2013, p. 101) pose: 
  A critical juncture is a double-edged sword that can cause a sharp turn in the 
 trajectory of a nation. On the one hand it can open the way for breaking the cycle of 
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 extractive institutions and enable more inclusive ones to emerge, (..). Or it can 
 intensify the emergence of extractive institutions.   
 
Political inclusive vs. extractive  
What is positive change according to Acemoglu and Robinson? In their theory, they 
make a division between inclusive and extractive political systems, in which inclusiveness is 
the ultimate goal. A politically inclusive state has to have “pluralistic political institutions” 
and has to be centralized (ibid, p. 80). Centralization refers to the capability of the 
government to maintain order and stability (ibid, p. 187). The lack of centralization could 
cause disruption by oppositional groups (ibid, p. 87). The other fundament is pluralistic 
political institutions. Those are described as “political institutions that distribute power 
broadly in society and subject it to constraints” (ibid, p. 80). “Instead of being vested in a 
single individual or a narrow group, political power rests with a broad coalition or a plurality 
of groups” (ibid). The opposite of inclusive political states are political extractive states. 
Those states are missing either a plural distribution of power or lack in centralization 
capability (ibid, p. 430). In extractive states, the political power is often in the hands of a 
single individual or a narrow group. Often, their power isn’t constrained (ibid, p. 80).  
Political inclusiveness can be achieved by becoming democratic. Acemoglu and 
Robinson describe democratization as “the de jure political power is allocated to the majority, 
so the balance is tilted towards the citizens” (2008, p. 285). Resulting in the power falling in 
the hands of a broad coalition or a plurality of groups (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013, p. 80). 
Egypt and Tunisia underwent a democratic transition. Both countries were very centralized, 
having until the Arab uprisings a powerful autocratic ruler that was perceived as invincible. 
All the power was vested in the hands of the autocratic ruler, namely Mubarak in Egypt and 
Ben Ali in Tunisia, which made it political extractive states. While Tunisia succeeded in the 
transition to a democracy after the Arab Uprising, Egypt’s regime reversed once again into a 
dictatorship after a brief period of democratic rule. Egypt’s democracy was overthrown by a 
military coup, executed by the army chief Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (Hamzawy, 2017).  
Even though Acemoglu & Robinson give an explanation of institutional change via the 
interaction between the institutional drift and critical junctures, they leave the exact working 
of it vague. The theory doesn’t offer a specific set of requirements in determining the 
institutional drift, aside from leaving a big part open to contingency (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2013, p. 111). This theoretical gap is filled by the theories of Bellin and Makara. They pose a 
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specific model for diverging military institutionalization2. The focus is on the military because 
they played a major role in the transition. The military in Egypt blocked the transition, while 
in Tunisia it supported the transition (Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 35-36). Therefore, the focus will be 
on the comparison between the military institutions to explain the institutional drift. Providing 
a theoretical model that explains the institutional drift in the military institutions in Egypt and 
Tunisia. Bellin poses that the failure or success in the regime transitions towards a more 
democratic state are not determined by the lack of democratic prerequisites. She states that the 
robustness of authoritarianism in the region is maintained through the presence of a strong 
coercive apparatus (Bellin, 2012, p. 128). Makara stresses the factor of motivation of the 
military apparatus complementary to Bellin’s theory.  
The institutional drift in the military institutions played a determining role in the 
outcome of the democratic transition. To illustrate the military’s influence on the road 
towards plurality there will be looked at the role of the labor unions during the transition. The 
reason to focus on labor unions is because they have the capacity to support the social 
dialogue held by different interest groups in the country. Even more so, they can play a vital 
role in the implementation of social dialogue outcomes (Karshenas, Moghadam & Alami, 
2014, p. 726). If given the chance to flourish, they form an important representative actor for 
a big part of the population. Thus, forming an additional actor in the competition for power 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013). Furthermore, labor unions can constrain the ruler’s power 
with the method of strike to protect workers’ rights (Hartshorn, 2015). In Tunisia, the labor 
unions played a big role in the transition helping in drafting the new constitution (ibid). While 
in Egypt, the labor unions weren’t able to do so, being blocked by the military apparatus 
(ibid). The success or the failure of the labor unions played a vital role in becoming more 
inclusive, hence forming an additional interest group represented in the competition for 
power.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
2 In their theory they make a distinction between the institutionalization of the military in the country. The 
institutionalization refers to the professionalism, autonomy and almost bureaucratic characteristics of the military 
(Weberian). This should not be mistaken for the institutions in Acemoglu & Robinson’s theory, who refer to the 
more general institution, which can be described as ‘rules of the game’.   
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Method of research 
The method of most similar systems design is used (also known as Mill’s Method of 
Difference). This method was used to find an explanation for the difference in regime 
outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia. The choice to compare Egypt and Tunisia, apart from sharing 
the same regional critical juncture, is because they are relatively similar. The neighbouring 
countries were both former colonies. They both became authoritarian states after its 
independence (Jebnoun, 2014; Aljazeera, 2013, 4 July). Both countries were autocracies 
instead of religious monarchies, like Morocco or Jordan (Gallala-Arndt, 2012, p. 141). The 
demonstrations against the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia therefore didn’t form an attack on 
religion. Making the autocracies more vulnerable in the Arab Uprising (ibid).  In addition, 
both countries lack an abundance of highly profitable resources such as oil, unlike many other 
countries in the region (Hess, 2013, p. 262). 
This bachelor thesis is based on the theory of historical institutionalism, focusing on 
the dynamics between institutional drift and a critical juncture on the road to political 
inclusiveness. The second section will illustrate the capacity of the labor unions to play a part 
in the democratic transition in Egypt and Tunisia. The third section, explains the military 
institutionalization theory of Bellin and the complementary theory of Makara. In the fourth 
section the institutionalization theory shall be applied on the military institutions of both 
countries. In the fifth section a conclusion shall be given regarding the diverging outcomes in 
Egypt and Tunisia, applying the theory of Acemoglu and Robinson combined with the 
theories of Bellin and Makara. All the information will be based on secondary literature, using 
articles, reports, books and news reports. 
I conclude that the theory of Acemoglu and Robinson combined with the theories of 
Bellin and Makara give a plausible explanation of the diverging outcomes in Egypt and 
Tunisia. Nevertheless, the institutional approach of Acemoglu and Robinson is postdictive. 
Therefore, it is a method to explain contemporary outcomes, not make future predictions 
(Hogan & Doyle, 2007, p. 886). This makes generalization of my results difficult. 
Furthermore, the Arab uprisings an immensely complex phenomenon. I attempted to answer a 
complicated question about a complex situation in just eight weeks. There has to be 
recognized that there are many variables that I didn’t take into account for example: elections, 
foreign interference, etc. I focused on the military institution and labor unions for a reason. 
This doesn’t mean that the other factors were less relevant.  
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2. DIFFERENT OUTCOMES 
In this section an overview shall be given of the democratic transition in both 
countries. As already stated, the focus will be on the labor unions in both countries. Labor 
unions can form an important instrument in becoming more inclusive. Egypt’s and Tunisia’s 
labor unions effect on the transition diverged largely. Therefore, in the next section the 
democratic transition shall be described, to find out what made the labor unions act 
differently. 
 
Egypt’s transition 
In Egypt it was decided to first have democratic elections before drafting the 
constitution. Between the period of the ousting of Mubarak and the elections, the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces took power to provide stability. The political party of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the Freedom and Justice party, and the extreme Salafist Nour Party won 
about 70% of the seats (Gallala-Arndt, 2012, p. 144). The Islamist dominance in parliament 
made the secularist afraid. Fearing that their interests and that of the minority groups would 
be overlooked. In addition, according to Osman there was a general distrust towards the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Namely the Muslim Brotherhood was first oppressed in Egypt. The 
radical change in becoming the leading party, made many Egyptians afraid, especially the 
upper-middle classes (Osman, 2017, p. 79). This polarized Egypt’s society, which became an 
important cause for the instability in the country.  
Naturally, the growing fragmentation didn’t help Egypt’s stability. For many Egyptian 
citizens the Constitution, drawn up by the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist Nour Party, 
seemed like the beginning of a religious state and with that losing the essence of 
‘Egytianness’ (ibid, p. 81). Social groups such as the Orthodox Copts, secularist, liberals, 
nationalists and leftist opposed the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in drafting the 
constitution. The Muslim Brotherhood failed to include the ambitions of the youth activists 
that helped bring Mubarak down (Salamey, 2015, p. 120). The tensions were running high. 
There started to be weekly confrontations between youth activists and Brotherhood associates. 
The anxiety for the Muslim Brotherhood and its commencing regime served to polarize and 
almost “paralyzed” the country (Osman, 2017, p. 96).  
The reaction of the labor unions was counterproductive. Namely, they refused to work 
with the Muslim Brotherhood. This meant that many times labor unions didn’t function at all 
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(ibid, p. 81). The labor unions that did proceed their work, were mostly ‘Brotherized’, having 
appointed new members that had connections to the new Muslim Brotherhood regime 
(Hartshorn, 2015, p. 115). Therefore, many people saw them as an asset of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Seeing them as less independent and decreasing their credibility. Which didn’t 
assist in reducing the polarization in society (ibid).   
Therefore, in Egypt’s transition the labor unions didn’t try to ease the tensions in the 
society, but they made it worse. This was a vital aspect missing in the implementation of the 
bottom-up movement of the Arab uprising (Butenschøn, 2015, p. 112). They weren’t able to 
help the social dialogue between the divided groups in society (Hartshorn, 2015, p. 100).  The 
groups that first worked together in overthrowing Mubarak, now worked against each other. 
This eventually led to massive demonstration against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the ousting of Morsi in July 2013. Which was executed by a military coup (Salamey, 2015, p. 
120).  
One important factor that influenced the behavior of the labor unions was the military. 
The labor unions were incapable to establish themselves as an independent actor during the 
transition. The Egyptian labor unions, and most importantly the ETUF, were viewed as an ally 
of the old-Mubarak-regime (Hartshorn, 2015, p. 104). The reason for this was that the ETUF 
officials were connected to the old-regime (ibid, p. 111). To get rid of these old ties, the labor 
union needed to reform. This reform was set in motion through the appointment of new 
officials. Samir Radwan set out a new agenda. There were new labor bargains established 
(ibid, p. 104). Except, this new labor bargain didn’t benefit the military. Namely, the strikes 
that were spreading in the country to ensure the new bargain were bringing instability and it 
was taking profit away from their businesses and industries. This was especially important to 
them, because the military owned up to an estimation of 40% of the economy’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) (Makara, 2016, p. 217). This made that the military intervened.  
The strikes that broke out affected the military owned industries (ibid). This the 
military wouldn’t accept, which resulted in the military intervening. Their message was clear: 
“ no broad based strikes, no concentration of power in the hands of political leaders, and no 
sale of “critical” industries” (Hartshorn, 2015, p. 110).  Therefore, the military supported a 
new law which prohibited everything that “makes a stand or undertakes an activity that results 
in the prevention of, obstruction, or hindering a State’s institution or a public authority or a 
public or private working organization from performing its work” (ibid, p. 111). This didn’t 
actually outlaw strikes, but if broadly interpreted, could categorize them as illegal activities. 
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Furthermore, the strikes would have to be approved, which wasn’t often the case. This took 
away one of the most important methods of force from the labor unions (ibid, p. 113). In 
practice, this resulted in the breakdown of many strikes by the military. In which they didn’t 
shy away from the use of violent force to oppress the labor unions (ibid). 
Aside from the military interference there was another factor that made them 
ineffective. Namely competition between the labor unions themselves. There were more labor 
unions set up that also received financial aid (ibid, p. 142). They worked against each other. 
The division of the labor unions, formed a lack of an overarching organization that would 
stand stronger in the process of democratization. Therefore, they were less able to formulate 
their goals, like in Tunisia. In addition, the competition between the labor unions formed their 
main priority, leaving less capacity for the support of the democratic transition (Hartshorn, 
2015).  
 
Tunisia’s transition 
Tunisia’s change remains the only “success story” in the Arab Uprisings. However, 
Tunisia’s transition hasn’t gone smoothly either (Moghadam, 2017, p. 625). Even though, the 
transition was calmer than in Egypt, the Tunisian society also fragmentated. The polarization 
between the secularists and Islamist became a deep cleavage in society (Osman, 2017, p. 84).  
With the democratic election of 23 of October 2011, the moderate Islamist party Ennahda 
won 41% of the seats (Gallala-Arndt, 2012, p. 143). It had to form a coalition to obtain a 
majority. A coalition was formed with two secularist parties, the Congress for the Republic 
and the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties. They were called the Troika. Working in 
a coalition turned out to be difficult, delaying the finalization of the constitution (Osman, 
2017, p. 88). The delay showed the deep cleavages between the religious and the secularist 
elements of the constitution. (ibid, p. 84).  
Ennahda recognized the fear that came with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. To 
avoid the same fate of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Ennahda had to give way to a lot 
of its own ambitions (Salamey, 2015, p. 125). Therefore, they acted in a more reserved way, 
assuring the opposition that it had no undemocratic intentions. In an official statement, the 
Ennahda promised that it would not declare the Sharia as state law (Gallala-Arndt, 2012, p. 
143). But it wasn’t enough, polarization caused tensions to run high. This eventually led to 
early parliamentary elections in 2014, avoiding a crisis. The departing of the Troika went 
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relatively smoothly through the efforts of four important groups. Those were the “General 
Labor Union (UGTT), the Tunisian Order of Lawyers, the Union of Industry, Trade and 
Handicrafts and lastly the Tunisian Human Rights League” (Abdelmoula, 2015), also called 
the Quartet. They helped facilitate the national dialogue bringing the groups together and 
hereby decreasing tension in the Tunisian society (ibid). These measures were vital in 
reaching a constitutional compromise. Leading to the ratification of a new civil constitution 
and hereby establishing the democracy (Salamey, 2015, p. 125). 
For a successful transition there was needed a constitution that was accepted by the 
majority and by the Tunisian people. They set up a constitution commission, called the 
Commission for the Realization of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reform and 
Democratic Transition. The commission contained representatives of the civil society in 
Tunisia and the largest political parties, which also includes the labor unions (Gallala-Arndt, 
2012, p. 143). The labor unions were one of the important actors in the transition through the 
making of the constitution (Hartshorn, 2015). The political absence of the military in the 
regime change posed an important factor for its success. Hence the success of the labor 
unions, in particular the UGTT.  
The absence of the military in Tunisian politics made all possibilities an option. There 
was no coercive force blocking their way or trying to influence them. This made the new law 
proposals of the labor unions untainted (ibid, p. 194). Even more so, the labor unions were 
able to flourish in Tunisia because it enjoyed protection from the military institutions against 
any violent forces against them (Salamey, 2015, p. 124). This made the security of the labor 
unions significantly better than that in Egypt. Where the method of strikes was made almost 
impossible and oppressed (Hartshorn, 2015, p. 110). 
Another factor was that the military wasn’t politically involved because it had no 
economic assets to protect (ibid, p. 198). It also didn’t have any historical experience with the 
oppression of the population and its organizations, this being a mandate of the security 
apparatus and not the military’s (Anderson, 2011, p. 4). Both factors made it possible for the 
UGTT to take part in the making of the constitution. Helping the transition to succeed 
(Hartshorn, 2015, p. 100). 
In contrast to the Egyptian labor unions, the UGTT has a state independent history. 
The UGTT was part of the opposition in the demonstrations during the Arab uprisings. Even 
before the Arab uprising, it was one of the only actors that opposed the former regime. Strikes 
12 
 
were their method of force to reach their goals (ibid, p. 195). With the election of the Ennahda 
party, also connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, friction and anxiety rose between the 
secularist and Islamist. The fragmentation in society was similar to that in Egypt. On the other 
hand, the Ennahda needed to form a coalition to get a majority, while Morsi didn’t. The three 
parties that formed the coalition, called the Troika, shared the executive power over the state 
(ibid, p. 198). None of these parties held any significant influence over the labor unions (ibid, 
p. 199).  This excluded the Ennahda from the labor unions, which maintained the 
independence from the regime. This was a factor that helped in staying independent. 
The UGTT had an enormous mobilization capacity. Having around a half million of 
members, forming a vast group that couldn’t be ignored. One reason for the higher 
mobilization capacity was that, unlike in Egypt, it was an actor with prestige. This resulted 
from having no ties with the former regime. Another reason was that only the UGTT received 
support from the newly elected regime. Minimizing the disruptive effect of upcoming labor 
and trade unions, which gave the UGTT the possibility to focus on the democratic transition 
(ibid). In which it didn’t only focus on its traditional role, protecting labor rights, but also on 
broader subjects such as secularism (ibid, p. 204). The mobilization capability combined with 
independence made the labor unions an important institution for social change (Salamey, 
2015, p. 123). Thus, an important actor during the democratic transition.  
 
The labor unions role in the transition 
Both countries struggled with the rising polarization in society, in which secularists 
and Islamist pitted against each other. While the Egyptian labor unions were politically 
insignificant during the transition, the Tunisian labor unions were a determining factor in the 
process of change (Beinin, 2016, p. 14). One of the factors that reduced the tension in Tunisia 
was the UGTT (Hartshorn, 2015). Which played a vital role in the democratic transition and 
the making of the constitution. Representing the general ‘working’ population in the process 
(ibid, p. 100). Hereby becoming more plural, because it formed an additional actor in the 
competition for power. The most important reason for its effectivity was that it had the 
possibility to use force to obtain its goals. The capability to threaten with strikes, gave them 
an instrument of force.  
Another reason for the UGTT’s success was the absence of a dominant military 
institution in Tunisia. In contrast to Egypt, Tunisia’s army was not politically involved, 
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therefore it didn’t try to oppress the labor unions. Even more so, it protected the labor unions. 
It didn’t try to take away the power of the labor unions, by breaking the strikes. This helped in 
keeping an important method of force for the UGTT. Giving the labor unions enough coercive 
power to become part of the drafting of the constitution. Which has been partly seen as factor 
for the success of the democratic transition (ibid).  
In Egypt the labor unions were incapable to establish themselves sufficiently to 
implement the ideational change. This was a vital aspect missing in the implementation of the 
bottom-up movement of the Arab uprising (Butenschon, 2013). They missed a cohesive force 
to hold the population together during the transition. The laws that implicitly forbade strikes, 
took away the power of the labor unions. In addition, the lack of an overarching national 
union made the labor unions in Egypt powerless (Hartshorn, 2015). Making them unable to 
implement the change needed during the transition (ibid, p. 100).  
An vital reason for ETUF’s lack of effectivity was the influence the military had on 
politics. They made the method of strike almost impossible in Egypt, taking away its most 
important tool (ibid, p. 110). The presence of the military made it impossible for the labor 
unions to participate in politics. The Egyptian military was too powerful, forming an unequal 
playing field in which the labor unions couldn’t win. This blocked them from truly 
participating, and therefore in becoming more politically inclusive.  
 
3. THEORIZING INSTITUTIONAL DRIFT IN THE MILITARY 
The military has played an important role on the labor unions capability to perform. 
The question arises, why did the Egyptian and Tunisian military institutions act differently 
during the transition? In this section the theory of Bellin and Makara will be used to answer 
this question. They give an explanation for the divergence of military institutions. This 
divergence, I pose, is the institutional drift that lead to different results. 
 
Institutionalization of the military apparatus 
In the Arab Uprisings the military has played a major role in the survival of the 
authoritarian regimes. In Egypt and Tunisia the army chose the side of the people, and 
therefore delivering the final blow to the dictators (Makara, 2016, p. 209). Makara and Bellin 
pose a theory on the behavior of the military. This is determined by the degree of 
14 
 
institutionalization of the military apparatus. The reasoning is that when the army is highly 
institutionalized it gains in autonomy which affects the relation with the regime (ibid, p. 211).  
The institutionalization makes them more independent and less reliant on the survival 
of the regime (ibid, p. 209). Eva Bellin therefore poses: “The more institutionalized the 
security establishment is, the more willing it will be to disengage from power and allow 
political reform to proceed. The less institutionalized it is, the less amenable it will be to 
reform” (ibid, p. 210). Bellin, Makara and Lutterbeck give specific components that define the 
difference between an institutionalized or a patrimonial military apparatus, along the lines of a 
Weberian approach. Institutionalized militaries are characterized as meritocratic, not-
predatory, not-corrupt, and serving the nation (ibid, p. 211). The opposite of an 
institutionalized military institution is a patrimonial military apparatus. They are characterized 
as based on cronyism, corruption, and serving the interests of individual political or social 
groups (mostly ethnic or communal) over society (ibid). Makara (2016, p. 212) summarizes 
patrimonial rule as “The regime receives the military’s protection, while the military receives 
privileged access to the best housing, health care, and control over economic ventures”. 
Because of their close ties to the regime, their organizational survival depends on the survival 
of the despotic ruler (ibid, p. 212).  
There are different patrimonial measures that the authoritarian ruler could use to 
prevent the army from defecting. The first is patronage distribution. That is providing the 
army in economic and political privileges, therefore creating incentives to stay loyal. This is a 
frequent used measure in the MENA-region. Another measure is communal ties. This refers to 
the employment of a certain ethnic or social group that are regarded as loyal to the regime. 
Lastly, building multiple layers of intelligence agencies monitoring the military. Those 
intelligence agencies are mostly directly connected with the ruler (ibid, p. 212).   
Concluding, when the military institution is patrimonial, it has close ties with and its 
existence is dependent on the ruling regime. The control of the ruling regime over the 
military, provides it with a powerful coercive tool. If the military is institutionalized the 
regime has less to no power over the military, making it independent (Bellin, 2012, p. 128). 
The institutionalization of the military effects the plurality of the regime. The reason for this 
is that when the military apparatus is institutionalized, it is depoliticized. Resulting in the 
separation of the regime and the coercive power, the military. This creates a more level-
playing field in the competition for power. Becoming more open to other groups to compete 
on an equal scale. This effect showed itself in Egypt, where the military blocked the labor 
unions method of strike and thereby taking away the labor unions power.  
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Motivation of the military apparatus 
The degree of institutionalization of the military explains why both the military in 
Tunisia and eventually that of Egypt have chosen the side of the people. But this still doesn’t 
explain why the Tunisian military supported the democratic transition, while the Egyptian 
military has eventually chosen to block the transition. Therefore, another important aspect is 
the motivation of the military. Why it acts the way it does. One reasons is that when the 
military feels marginalized, it can use a crisis situation to break ties with the ruling regime to 
improve their position. Offering an opportunity to “outflank their competitors and obtain a 
privileged position in the post-regime political system” (Makara, 2016, p. 215).  
A distinction can be made between the more offensive and defensive behavior of the 
military. The defensive motives can be explained when the military’s ‘core interests’ are 
threatened. The military will try to seize power, gaining back control over these ‘core 
interests’ (Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 30). Offensive motives can occur when it has the “potential to 
dominate the executive”. Which is aggravated when a state is historically dominated by the 
military through direct rule or close ties to the ruling regime (ibid).  
 
4. MILITARY INSTITUTIONALIZATION THEORY APPLIED ON EGYPT AND 
TUNISIA  
Institutionalization in Egypt 
Sadat and his successor Mubarak, tried to minimize the military’s influence over 
national politics. This resulted in the military being shunned from positions in the 
government. This kept them out of everyday politics, but it still formed a key actor in politics. 
This was caused by the phenomenon that all the ruling leaders of Egypt were handpicked by, 
and came from the military officer corps (ibid, p. 36).  
The relation between the higher military officers and the former ruling regime formed 
a protection for the economic power of the military. Egypt’s armed forces were notorious for 
its big influence over the economy, owning up to an estimated 40% of the economy’s GDP 
(Makara, 2016, p. 217). This made the military the most influential and most powerful actor 
in the country (Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 36). The military had power over a broad range of 
significant industries and businesses in Egypt, making their power entrenched in society. 
This economic power has been justified by the military under the guise of being 
beneficial for society, relieving the public budget (ibid, p. 37).This was accepted because the 
military institution was one of the most respected institutions in the country (ibid, p. 36). In 
addition, nobody could prove the military wrong. The reason for this is that there is no official 
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record of the military’s economic assets. No source can give more than an estimation of the 
economic share of the military. Making the military unaccountable and unintelligible, even 
for the former authorities. The lack of transparency has formed an incentive for corruption 
(ibid, p. 37).  
The military also benefitted from “access to the best housing and health care in the 
country” (Makara, 2016, p. 217). These patrimonial methods were used to buy the military’s 
loyalty towards the regime. On the other hand, like in Tunisia, the Egyptian army declared the 
protests as legitimate and pledged not to use measures of force towards the demonstrators 
(Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 37). The military’s role has been described as contradictory (ibid), the 
International Crisis Group cited in Lutterbeck (2013, p. 37-38) posed that “Throughout the 
protests, the army played a consistently ambiguous role, purportedly standing with the people 
while at the same time being an integral part of the regime they were confronting. It found 
itself almost literally on both sides of the barricades”.  
In contrast to the Tunisian military, the Egyptian army didn’t support the cause. They 
tried to put an end to the upheaval, demanding that the protesters return home (ibid, p. 38). 
Furthermore, the army has used violent methods towards the protesters to stabilize the 
country. Even though they used less force than the security services. This use of violence 
didn’t happen in Tunisia (ibid). Eventually it sided with the opposition and helped the 
overthrowing of the Mubarak regime. Therefore, it still played an influential role in the 
regime change. When Mubarak resigned, the army stepped in its place to fill the temporary 
power vacuum till the elections (ibid, p. 39).  
In sum, the Egyptian military can be described as medium institutionalized, that is 
with patrimonial characteristics like patronage, corruption, favoritism and cronyism (ibid, p. 
36). The former leaders tried to marginalized the military in politics, but it still had a major 
influence over politics. This was partly established and maintained by the economic power it 
had obtained through patronage (Makara, 2016, p. 217).  
 
Egypt’s military motivation 
The Egyptian military has a long history in the country’s rule (Aljazeera, 2013, 4 
July).  Combined with the enormous economic power of the military apparatus, it made them 
very powerful. On the other side, it gave them a lot to lose. Forming a strong incentive to 
intervene. In a period of radical change, the military tried to find a way to protect their power. 
Kahled Fahmy describes their behavior during the aftermath of the Arab uprising as: “The 
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military is trying to find a formula whereby it can guarantee its position in the post-election 
Egypt, so it has been trying different tactics” (Horesh & Bollier, 2011).  
It first tried working with the Muslim Brotherhood. But this attempt failed. Morsi 
started taking power from the military. A conflict near Rafah gave Morsi the opportunity to 
act against the military. First, he removed the commander of the military police. Second, he 
removed the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff and the three head of the Army, the Navy, 
and the Air Force. He replaced them with younger more susceptible officers (Hillel, 2013, p. 
195). By removing the commander of the military Morsi ended any possible cooperation 
between the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood (ibid, p. 198). The marginalization of the 
military’s political power affected the military’s political prestige, one of the military’s ‘core 
interests’. The threat this ‘core interest’ formed a defensive incentive to intervene.  
Another ‘core interest’ was its economic power. This was affected by an important 
development, namely privatization. Many countries in the region, including Tunisia and 
Egypt, underwent these economic changes. Since the 1980’s these privatization measures 
were set in to motion. But through the close connection to the former regime, the Egyptian 
military was able to protect its own businesses and industries from this development 
(Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 37). With the ousting of the old regime, the economic patronage 
disappeared. As already Morsi wasn’t cooperative towards the military. This threatened the 
economic power of the military. Giving them another defensive motive to intervene in the 
regime. 
Aside from having defensive motives for interference, the Egyptian military apparatus 
also has offensive motives. Owning around 40% of the economy’s GDP, it gave them the 
ability to dominate the executive power (Makara, 2016, p. 217). The combination of the 
historical gained political prestige and economical power gave the military the final say. 
When Morsi didn’t stabilize the economy and didn’t respect the military power, the military 
stepped in (Butenschøn, 2015, p. 125; Aljazeera, 2013, 4 July).  
 
Institutionalization in Tunisia 
The Tunisian regime was an authoritarian regime, just like Egypt. However, there has 
been one important difference. The military institution has been quite exceptional (Lutterbeck, 
2013, p. 34). In many post independent states in the region the military had played an 
important role in stabilizing and ruling the country, becoming dependent on the military. In 
Tunisia this wasn’t the case. Even though the army played a vital role in becoming 
independent, the new ruler, Bourguiba, didn’t have a military career beforehand. In his rule he 
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used French republican principles, which marked a clear separation between politics and the 
military (ibid). Bourguiba’s decision to subordinate the military in politics was based on the 
fear that he felt for a strong military and the threat it could pose on his power. Although the 
successor of Bourguiba had a military background, Ben Ali had more ties to the intelligence 
services than to the army (ibid). Compared to Egypt this separation between the ruler and the 
military forces forms an important contrast. This absence in public and political affairs earned 
them the nickname La Grande Muette, the big silent one (ibid).   
The military’s power in politics has been minimized since the independence of 
Tunisia. The former president Bourguiba established restrictions on the interference of 
military in politics. Those were for example, the prohibition to join or form a political 
organization for members of the army (Jebnoun, 2014, p. 298). The army was left out at the 
decision-making processes. Their only mandate was protecting the sovereignty by protecting 
the border (ibid). Aside from the political exclusion of the military, it still played an important 
political role in connecting the state with its population. This was accomplished through the 
mandatory military service. Furthermore, the army gave the Tunisian nation a symbol of 
unity. This was one of the fundaments for building the Tunisian state after its independence 
from France (ibid, p. 299).  
Tunisia’s army was also economically marginalized by both Bourguiba and later Ben 
Ali. Bourguiba provided minimal means to execute its mandate (ibid). At the time of the 
Uprising the regime spend only 1,4% of its GDP on the military, compared to Egypt with 
4,3%, this was very little. In addition, the army had around 35,000 personnel. This was just a 
fraction if you compare it to the 150,000 employees of the security services, the National 
Guard and National security (Makara, 2016, p. 217). The military institution was controlled 
by the Ministry of the Interior and had almost no connections with the ruling elites. The 
exception was the Presidential Guard, which was under the direct rule of the President. Except 
for the Presidential Guard, all the security institutions like the military were under paid and 
underequipped. The obvious reason for this was to keep it from forming a threat for the 
regime. This caused disgruntlement and frustration under the military (ibid, p. 218)3.  
Aside from having little economic funds, the military was professional and 
institutionalized, outside the control of the executive power, the authoritarian ruler 
(Townsend, 2015, p. 7). These characteristics are based on the French model, who were the 
                                                            
3 This didn’t result in the army’s attempt to gain in influence after the ousting of Ben Ali, 
which Makara’s theory predicts. This shall be further explained in the section of Tunisia’s 
military motivation.   
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former colonizers of Tunisia. In addition, the military was trained by American institutions 
(ibid). Which made the distance between the ruling power and the army even wider. Even 
though the military was professionalized and institutionalized, there was a degree of 
competition for power that was similar to Egypt. Which resulted in the various intelligence 
institutions as a “coup-proofing strategy” (Makara, 2016, p. 218).  
Ben Ali continued to marginalize the military institution. He set up various security 
institutions and improved the police security apparatus with economic funds. Which became 
five times bigger than the military, and was used to execute the rulers policies. This excluded 
the military of the task to oppress its fellow civilians (Townsend, 2015, p. 7). In addition, he 
imposed the “iron-fisted policy” oppressing all opposition from the military towards his 
security-oriented regime (Jebnoun, 2014, p. 302).  
It is important to underline the fact that the regime had little power over the military. 
This gave them the power to refuse orders during the Arab uprising. The first order they 
refused to execute was to deny the right of a funeral for the fallen demonstrators. The second 
was that it refused to wear the security forces’ uniform. And finally the military General 
Ammar commanded that any open-fire on demonstrators would have to come from the 
military command itself (ibid, p. 305). With this last refusal the military defected, placing 
themselves as guard of the civilian protesters (Makara, 2016, p. 218).  
Concluding, the Tunisian military apparatus was highly institutionalized. It was based 
on a French republican model, which depoliticized the military institution. In addition, they 
didn’t receive economic benefits from the state, keeping their economic power marginalized. 
Giving them no executive power to interfere in politics. Jebnoun (2014, p. 311) concludes that 
because the army was highly institutionalized, the uprising and the transition could become a 
success. It also separates itself from other countries in the region, that don’t share this 
independent and professionalized military history. Townsend adds, that the military supported 
the civilian governance. With this support and the acceptance of democratic control, the 
establishment of a representative system and constitution was made possible (Townsend, 
2015, p. 8).  
 
Tunisia’s military motivation 
When the Tunisian army sided with the protesters during the Arab uprisings, there 
arose claims that the military had political motives in doing so. Trying to gain in political 
influence. The response of the army was clear. They made an official statement, saying that 
“[they] will not deviate from the constitution” (Al-Quds Al-Arabi, January 22, 2011, cited in 
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Jebnoun, 2014, p. 311). This wasn’t an empty claim. With the end of the Arab Uprising, the 
military retreated “to their barracks” (Townsend, 2015, p. 7), giving space for democratic 
transition to commence (ibid). The question is why did the military decide to stay clear from 
politics. 
One of the reason for interference posed by Makara is, that if the military feels 
marginalized it can use a crisis to stop this process of marginalization and gain in power and 
influence. As stated above, the Tunisian military apparatus was marginalized by both 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Their economic funds were minimal and their political power was 
minimized. This did cause frustration in the military institution (Makara, 2016, p. 218). Still, 
the Tunisian military apparatus didn’t act accordingly to Makara’s theory. 
One explanation for retreating out of the political sphere after the Arab uprisings is the 
long history of separation of power of the military institution. The Tunisian military was 
based on a professionalized French republic model, which goes back even before its 
independence (Townsend, 2015, p. 7). Therefore, it has never played a political role in the 
ruling of the country. Since their role was non-existent in the politics, it didn’t develop in 
being one of the military’s ‘core interests’ (Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 30). Therefore, it formed no 
defensive motive to interfere.  
Furthermore, it didn’t need to protect the regime to secure its own survival. This 
resulted from the political and economic marginalization. This forms a big contrast with the 
other security forces such as the Presidential Guard. That had close ties with the regime and 
was therefore dependent on the regime’s survival. When the Arab uprising started, they were 
forced to oblige the order of oppressing the protests. This resulted in 78 reported civilian 
deaths, the actual number of killings estimated higher even higher (Makara, 2016, p. 218). 
In sum, one of the reasons why it supported the democratic transition was that it had 
no close ties to the old regime. In addition, the degree of institutionalization gave no 
incentives to block the transition. It had been economically marginalized and it didn’t have 
patronage connections to the former ruling regime. Therefore, it didn’t create a dominating 
capacity over the executive power. Giving the military no political or economic means or 
motive to act offensively regarding the ruling power. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Acemoglu & Robinson’s theory has provided a theoretical model to help explain the 
different outcomes in the countries Egypt and Tunisia after the Arab uprisings. Major 
institutional changes can occur through the dynamics between a critical juncture and 
institutional drift (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013). The different paths taken after the Arab 
uprising in Egypt and Tunisia can be explained through the institutional drift of the military 
institution. As Bellin and Makara state that when a military apparatus is more institutionalized 
it will more likely support regime change (ibid, p. 210).  In direct relation to the 
institutionalization is the motivation of the military, which determines the actions of the 
military.  
In Egypt and Tunisia the military apparatus were both institutionalized, being 
professional, based on meritocratic values and, relatively autonomic. Though this description 
fits the Tunisian military better (Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 36). While being institutionalized, the 
military of Egypt showed patrimonial characteristics. One of those patrimonial features was 
the role it played in politics since the independence (ibid). In both countries, the leaders tried 
to keep the military out everyday politics. Only Tunisia succeeded in this political 
marginalization. Egypt’s military institution played a vital part in the appointment of Egypt’s 
autocratic rulers (Makara, 2016, p. 217). While the Tunisian military didn’t share any 
significant connections with the former regime, being largely depoliticized. 
Another import difference caused by the diverging degree of institutionalization was 
the economic power that was maintained through patronage in Egypt (Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 
39). Mubarak tried to buy the military’s loyalty by economic protection. Resulting in the 
Egyptian military owning up to 40% of the GDPs economy, therefore it possessed enormous 
power (Makara, 2016, p. 217). This formed an important difference with Tunisia, which 
didn’t possess any significant economic power (ibid). 
While Tunisia succeeded in the transition to a democracy, Egypt’s regime reversed 
once again into a dictatorship after a brief period of democratic rule (Hamzawy, 2017). The 
military played a major part in blocking the transition to a more political inclusive regime. On 
the other hand, in Tunisia the military was an important factor in supporting the 
democratization in Tunisia (Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 35-36). The institutionalization of the 
military had everything to do with this divergence in outcomes. The Egyptian army was less 
open to the pro-reform opposition compared to the Tunisian army (Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 38). 
According to Abdelmoula (2015), Tunisia could have suffered the same fate as Egypt if the 
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military hadn’t been as highly institutionalized as it was. The Tunisian military institution was 
depoliticized. It committed itself only to protecting national borders, lacking the incentives to 
do more than that. While in Egypt the military acted more on its own behalf, having the 
means and the motives to do so (Makara, 2016, p. 217).  
This difference played a vital role in the success of the transition. Namely, the lack of 
a predominant group in politics, the more plural the power was distributed. Resulting in the 
inclusion of more equal groups in the competition for power. This made the Tunisian regime 
more politically inclusive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013, p. 103). Partly made possible by the 
efforts of the labor union the UGTT in Tunisia (Hartshorn, 2015). Being one of the groups 
that helped in forming the constitution, and hereby making Tunisia more inclusive (ibid, p. 
100). In Egypt, this didn’t happen. The lack of participation in the transition by the ETUF is 
caused by many factors. Nevertheless, the presence of the military played an important part. 
There was no level playing field in the political field through the presence of the military 
institution in the transition process. The military was the de facto power in Egypt, which 
blocked any activity that could harm their power (Anderson, 2011, p. 3). 
In this bachelor thesis, the different regime outcomes in Tunisia and Egypt can partly 
be explained by the historical divergence of institutionalization of the military institution. I 
pose that the institutional drift in the military apparatus was a determining factor in becoming 
more inclusiveness in Egypt and Tunisia. The reason for this is the absence of political 
involvement by the Tunisian military apparatus. The military has one very important facet, 
namely coercive power. In the process of the struggle for power, there has to be a relatively 
equal level of power between the various groups competing. Giving every group a fair chance 
at gaining a piece of political power. If the military is participating in this battle for power, it 
can create an unequal distribution of power. This happened in Egypt, where the military had 
the final say and chose to block any further process of democratization and with that 
inclusivity. In Tunisia, the military’s political power already marginalized, stayed clear from 
the political realm due to the institutionalization. Resulting in an equal playing ground. 
Furthermore, the various groups competing weren’t influenced by an almighty power 
hovering over them. This gave them the space needed to form and formulate the will of the 
people, becoming more representative towards the population. Hence, making the process 
more inclusive. Not to say that this made the process of becoming inclusive easy, but it made 
it possible. 
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